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1ABSTRACT
The purpose of this article is to explain the spread between spot rates on corporate and
government bonds.   We find that the spread can be explained in terms of three elements: (1)
compensation for expected default of corporate bonds (2) compensation for state taxes since
holders of corporate bonds pay state taxes while holders of government bonds do not, and  (3)
compensation for the additional systematic risk in corporate bond returns relative to government
bond returns.    The systematic nature of corporate bond return is shown by relating that part of
the spread which is not due to expected default or taxes to a set of variables which have been
shown to effect risk premiums in stock markets  Empirical estimates of the size of each of these
three components are provided in the paper.  We stress the tax effects because it has been ignored
in all previous studies of corporate bonds. 
2 INTRODUCTION 
In recent years there have been a number of papers examining the pricing of corporate
debt. These papers have varied from theoretical analysis of the pricing of risky debt using option
pricing theory, to a simple reporting of the default experience of various categories of risky debt.
The vast majority of the articles dealing with corporate spreads have examined yield differentials
of corporate bonds relative to government bonds.  The purpose of this article is to re-examine
and explain the differences in the rates offered on corporate bonds and those offered on
government bonds (spreads), and in particular to examine whether there is a risk premium in
corporate bond spreads and, if so, why does it exist. As part of our analysis, we argue that
differences in corporate and government rates should be measured in terms of spot rates (yield to
maturity on zero coupon debt) rather than yield to maturity on coupon bonds.
Differences in spot rates between corporate and government bonds (the corporate spot
spreads) differ across rating classes and should be positive for each rating class for the following
four reasons:
1. Expected default loss -- some corporate bonds will default and investors require a higher
promised payment to compensate for the expected loss from defaults. 
2. Tax premium – interest payments on corporate bonds are taxed at the state level while
interest payments on government bonds are not.
1 Most of the models using option pricing techniques assume a zero risk premium. 
Bodie, Kane, and Marcus (1993) assume the spread is all default premium. See
also Fons (1994) and Cumby and Evans (1995). On the other hand, rating based
pricing models like Jarrow Lando and Turnbull (1997) and Das-Tufano (1996)
assume that any risk premium impounded in corporate spreads is captured by
adjusting transition probabilities.
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3. Liquidity effect ) corporate bonds have higher and more volatile bid ask spreads and there
may be a delay in finding a counter-party for a transaction.  Investors need to be
compensated for these risks.
4. Risk premium – The return on corporate bonds are riskier than the returns on government
bonds, and investors may require a premium for the higher risk. 
The only controversial part of the above analysis is the fourth point. Some authors in their
analysis assume that the risk premium is zero in the corporate bond market.1 
This paper is important because it provides the reader with explicit estimates of each of 
the components of the spread between corporate bond spot rates and government bond spot rates.
While some studies have examined losses from default, to the best of our knowledge, none of
these studies has examined tax effects or made the size of compensation for systematic risk
explicit.  Tax effects occur because the investor in corporate bonds is subject to state taxes on
payments while government bonds are not subject to state taxes.  Thus, corporate bonds have to
2 See for example Altman (1989), Goodman (1989), Blume, Keim and Patel (1991),
and Cornell and Green (1991).
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offer a higher pre-tax return to yield the same after tax return.  This tax effect has been ignored in
the empirical literature on corporate bonds.  In addition, past research has ignored or failed to
measure whether corporate bond prices contain a risk premium above and beyond the expected
loss from default.  We find that the risk premium is a large part of the spread.  We show that
corporate bonds require a risk premium because spreads and returns vary systematically with the
same factors as common stock returns.  If investors in common stocks require compensation for
this risk so should investors in corporate bonds.  The source of the risk premium in corporate
bond prices has long been a puzzle to researchers and this study is the first explanation for its
size and existence.  
Why do we care about estimating the spread components separately rather than simply
pricing corporate bonds off a spot yield curve or a set of estimated risk neutral probabilities? 
First, we want to know the forces driving prices and not simply what prices are.  Second, for an
investor thinking about purchasing corporate bonds, the size of each component embodied in
market prices will affect the decision on whether to purchase the bonds.
 To illustrate this last point, consider the literature that  indicates that low-rated bonds
produce higher average returns than bonds with higher ratings.2 Further, consider the literature,
such as Blume, Keim and Patel (1991), that shows the standard deviation of returns is no higher
for low-rated bonds than it is for high-rated bonds.  What does this evidence indicate for
investment?   This evidence has been used to argue that low-rated bonds are attractive
investments. Our decomposition of corporate spreads into expected default loss, tax premium
5and risk premium shows that these results need to be interpreted differently. As we will show, the
tax and risk premium are substantial, and are higher for low rated bonds than for high rated
bonds, and thus the conclusion that low-rated bonds are superior investments may be incorrect
for almost all investors. 
 This paper proceeds as follows: In the first section, we present a description of the data
employed in this study and how our sample is constructed. In the second section we present the
methodology for, and present the results of, extracting government and corporate spot rates from
data on individual coupon bonds. We then examine the differentials between the spot rates which
exist for corporate bonds and those that exist for government bonds. We find that the corporate
spot spreads are higher for lower rated bonds, and that they tend to go up with maturity. The
shape of the spot spread curve can be used to differentiate between alternative corporate bond
valuation models derived from option pricing theory.  In this section we also examine the ability
of estimated spot rates to price corporate bonds. How bad is the approximation? We answer this
by examining pricing errors on corporates using the spot rates extracted from our sample of
corporate bonds.
The remainder of this paper is concerned with decomposing corporate spreads into
parts that are due to expected default loss, tax premium, and risk premium. In the third section of
this paper we model and estimate that part of the corporate spread which is due to expected
default loss. If we assume, for the moment, that there is no risk premium, then we can value
3 We also temporarily ignore the tax disadvantage of corporate bonds relative to 
government bonds in this section. 
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corporate bonds under a risk neutral assumption using expected default losses.3 This risk neutral
assumption allows us to construct a model of what the corporate spot spread would be if it were
solely due to expected default losses and to estimate it using historical data on rating transition
probabilities, default rates, and recovery rates after default. The spot rate spread curves estimated
by incorporating only expected losses due to default are well below the observed spot spread
curve and they do not increase as we move to lower ratings as fast as actual spot curves do.   The
difference between these curves can only be due to taxes and possibly a risk premium.
In the next section of this paper we examine the impact of both the expected default loss
and the tax premium on corporate spot spreads. In particular, we build taxes into the risk neutral
valuation model developed earlier and estimate the set of spot rates that should be used to
discount promised cash payments when taxes and expected default losses are taken into
consideration. We then show that using the best estimate of tax rates, historical rating transition
probabilities, and recovery rates, actual corporate spot spreads are still much higher than taxes
and default premiums can account for. Furthermore, fixing taxes at a rate that explains the spread
on AA debt still doesn’t explain the A and BBB spreads. The difference in spreads across rating
categories has to be due to the presence of a risk premium. Also, to explain empirical spreads, the
compensation the investor requires for risk must be higher for lower rated debt and for longer
maturity bonds.
7The last section of this paper presents direct evidence of the existence of a risk premium
by first relating the time series of that part of the spreads that is not explained by expected loss or
taxes to a set of variables that are generally considered systematic factors impacting risk in the
literature of Financial Economics and then by relating cross sectional differences in spreads to
sensitivities of each spread to these variables. We have already shown that the default premium
and tax premium can only partially account for the difference in corporate spreads. In this section
we present direct evidence that there is a risk premium by showing that part of the corporate
spread, not explained by defaults or taxes,  is related to systematic factors that are generally
believed to be priced in the market.
I. DATA
Our bond data is extracted from the Lehman Brothers Fixed Income database distributed
by Warga (1998). This database contains monthly price, accrued interest, and return data on all
investment grade corporate and government bonds. In addition, the database contains descriptive
data on bonds including coupon, ratings, and callability.
A subset of the data in the Warga database is used in this study. First, all bonds that were
matrix-priced rather than trader-priced are eliminated from the sample. Employing matrix prices
might mean that all our analysis uncovers is the formula used to matrix price bonds rather  than
the economic influences at work in the market. Eliminating matrix priced bonds leaves us with a
4 The only difference in the way CRSP data is constructed and our data is 
constructed is that over the period of our study, CRSP used an average of bid/ask 
quotes from five primary dealers called randomly by the New York Fed rather 
than a single dealer. However, comparison of a period when CRSP data came 
from a single dealer and also from the five dealers surveyed by the Fed showed no
difference in accuracy (Sarig and Warga (1989)).  Also in Section II, the errors in
pricing government bonds when spots are extracted from the Warga data are
comparable to the errors when spots are extracted from CRSP data. Thus our data
should be comparable in accuracy to the CRSP data.
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set of prices based on dealer quotes. This is the same type of data as that contained in the
standard academic source of government bond data: the CRSP government bond file.4
Next, we eliminate all bonds with special features that would result in their being priced
differently. This means we eliminate all bonds with options (e.g,. callable or sinking fund), all
corporate floating rate debt, bonds with an odd frequency of coupon payments, government
flower bonds and index-linked bonds.
Next, we eliminate all bonds not included in the Lehman Brothers bond indexes because
researchers in charge of the database at Lehman Brothers indicated that the care in preparing the
data was much less for bonds not included in their indexes. This results in eliminating data for all
bonds with a maturity of less than one year.
Finally, we eliminate bonds where the price data or return data was problematic. This
involved examining the data on bonds which had unusually high pricing errors when priced using
the spot curve. Bond pricing errors were examined by filtering on errors of different sizes and a
5 The methodology used to do this is described later in this paper. We also
examined $3 and $4 filters. Employing a $3 or $4 filter would have eliminated
few other bonds, since there were few intermediate-size errors, and we could not
find any reason for the error when we examined the few additional bonds that
would be eliminated.
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final filter rule of $5 was selected.5 Errors of $5 or larger are unusual, and this step resulted in
eliminating 2,710 bond months out of our total sample of 95,278 bond months. Examination of
the bonds that are eliminated because of large differences between model prices using estimated
spots and recorded prices shows that large differences were caused by the following:
1. The price was radically different from both the price immediately before the large error
and the price after the large error. This probably indicates a mistake in recording the data.
2. The company issuing the bonds was going through a reorganization that changed the
nature of the issue (such as its interest rate or seniority of claims), and this was not
immediately reflected in the data shown on the tape, and thus the trader was likely to have
based the price on inaccurate information about the bond’s characteristics.
3. A change was occurring in the company that resulted in the rating of the company
changing so that the bond was being priced as if it were in a different rating class.
We need to examine one further issue before leaving this section. The prices in the Warga
database are bid prices as are the institutional price data reported in DRI or Bloomberg.  Since
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the difference in the bid and ask price in the government market is less than this difference in the
corporate market, using bid data would result in a spread between corporate and government
bonds even if the price absent the bid ask spread were the same.  How big is this bias?
Discussion with researchers at Lehman Brothers indicates that for the bonds in our sample
(active corporate issues) the average spread was about 25 cents per $100. Elton and Green (1998)
show the average spread for governments is 5 cents. Thus, the bias is (25 -5)/2 or about 10 cents.
We will not adjust the spreads shown in our tables but the reader should realize they are about 10
cents too high. 
II. TERM STRUCTURE OF SPOTS?
In this section of the paper, we examine the difference in spot rates between corporate
bonds and Treasury bonds over various maturities. Our analysis has three parts. In the first part,
we explain why we examine spot rates rather than yield to maturity. In the second part, we
present the methodology for extracting spot rates and present the term structure of spreads over
our sample period. In the third part, we examine the pricing errors which result from valuing
corporate and government bonds using estimated spot rates.
A. Why Spots?
Most previous work on corporate spreads has defined corporate spread as the difference
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between the yield to maturity on a corporate bond (or an index of corporate bonds) and the yield
to maturity on a government bond (or an index of government bonds) of the same maturity. This
tradition goes back at least as far as Fisher (1959). Although most researchers now recognize that
there are problems with using yield to maturity, given the long tradition, a few  comments might
be helpful.
The basic reason for using spots rather than yield to maturity is that arbitrage arguments
hold with spot rates, not yield to maturity.  A spot rate is the yield to maturity or discount rate on
a zero coupon bond.  Since a riskless coupon paying bond can always be expressed as a portfolio
of zeros, it is also the rate that must be used to discount cash flows on riskless coupon paying
debt to prevent arbitrage.   Thus, finding two riskless coupon paying bonds with different yields
to maturity and the same maturity date does not indicate an arbitrage opportunity, whereas
finding two riskless zeros with different spot rates and the same maturity indicates a profitable
arbitrage.  In addition many authors use yield to maturity on an index of bonds.  Published
indexes use a weighted average of the yields of the component bonds to compute a yield to
maturity on the index.  Yields are not additive, so this is not an accurate way of calculating the
yield to maturity on an index.  
When we consider corporate bonds, another problem arises that does not hold with
riskless bonds; the spread in the yield to maturity on corporates relative to governments can
change even if there is no change in any of the fundamental factors that should affect spread,
6 Spot rates on promised payments may not be a perfect mechanism for pricing 
risky bonds because the law of one price will hold as an approximation when
applied to promised payments rather than risk adjusted expected payments.  See
Duffie and Singleton (1997) for a description of the conditions under which using
spots to discount cash flows is consistent with no arbitrage.
7 See Nelson and Siegal (1987). For comparisons with other procedures, see Green 
and Odegaard (1997) and Dahlquist and Svensson (1996). We also investigated 
the McCulloch cubic spline procedure and found substantially similar results 
throughout our analysis. The Nelson and Siegal model was fit using standard 
Gauss-Newton non-linear least squared methods.
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namely taxes, default rates and risk premiums. In particular, the difference in the yield to
maturity on corporates and the yield to maturity on governments is a function of the shape of the
term structure of governments. Inferences made about changes in risk in the corporate market
because of the changing spread in yield-to-maturity may be erroneous since the changes can be
due simply to changes in the shape of the government term structure. Thus, in this paper we
examine spreads in spot rates.6
B. The Term Structure of Corporate Spreads
In this section, we examine the corporate government spread for bonds in different rating
classes and with different maturities. While there are several methods of determining spot rates
from a set of bond prices, both because of its simplicity and proven success in deriving spots, we
have adopted the methodology put forth by Nelson and Siegel (N&S).7 The N&S methodology
involves fitting the following equations to all bonds in a given risk category to obtain the spot
rates that are appropriate for any point in time.
8 The Nelson and Siegal (1987) and McCulloch (1971) procedures have the
advantage of using all bonds outstanding within any rating class in the estimation
procedure, therefore, lessening the affect of   sparse data over some maturities and
lessening the affect of pricing errors on one or more bond.  The cost of these
procedures is that they place constraints on the shape of the yield curve. 
However, they do allow for a wide variety of general shapes including upward
sloping, downward sloping, and humped curves. 
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Where
Dt = the present value as of time zero for a payment that is received t periods in the future
rt = the spot rate at time zero for a payment to be received at time t
a0,  a1,  a2,  and a3 = parameters of the model.
The N&S procedure is used to estimate spot rates for different maturities for both
Treasury bonds and for bonds within each corporate rating class  for every month over the time
period January 1987 through December 1996.  This estimation procedure allows us on any date,
to use corporate coupon and principle payments and prices of all bonds within the same rating
class to estimate  the full spot yield (discount rate) curve which best explains the prices of all
bonds in that rating class on that date.8
9 For some of our analysis, we used Moodys data and for part S&P data. To avoid 
confusion we will always use S&P classifications though we will identify the
sources of data. When we refer to BBB bonds as rated by Moodys, we are
referring to the equivalent Moodys class, namely Baa.
10 This difference is not surprising because industrial and financial bonds differ both
in their sensitivity to systematic influences and idiosyncratic shocks which
occurred over the time period.
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As mentioned earlier, the data we use on risky bonds only exist for bonds of maturity
longer than one year. In addition, for most of the ten-year period studied, the number of AAA
bonds that existed and were dealer quoted was too small to allow for accurate estimation of a
term structure. Finally, data on corporate bonds rated below BBB was not available for most of
the time period we studied.9 Because of this, spot rates are only computed for bonds with
maturities between two to ten years for Treasury, AA, A and BBB-rated bonds. Initial
examination of the data showed that the term structure for financials was slightly different from
the term structure for industrials, and so in this section the results for each sector are reported
separately.10
We are concerned with measuring differences between corporate and government returns.
The corporate spread we examine is the difference between the spot rate on corporate bonds in a
particular rating class and spot rates for Treasury bonds of the same maturity. Table I presents
Treasury spot rates as well as corporate spreads for our sample of the three rating classes
discussed earlier: AA, A and BBB for maturities from two to ten years. In Panel A of Table I, we
have presented the average difference over our ten-year sample period, 1987-1996. In Panels B
and C we present results for the first and second half of our sample period. We expect these
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differences to vary over time.
There are a number of interesting results reported in these tables. Note that in general the
corporate spread for a rating category is higher for financials than it is for industrials. For both
financial and industrial bonds, the corporate spread is higher for lower-rated bonds for all spots
across all maturities in both the ten-year sample and the five-year subsamples. Bonds are priced
as if the ratings capture real information. To see the persistence of this influence, Figure 1
presents the time pattern of the spreads on six-year spot payments for AA, A and BBB industrial
bonds month by month over the ten-years of our sample. Note that the curves never cross. A
second aspect of interest is the relationship of corporate spread to the maturity of the spot rates.
An examination of Table I shows that there is a general tendency for the spreads to increase as
the maturity of the spot lengthens. However, for the ten years 1987-1996 and each five year sub-
period the spread on BBB industrial bonds exhibits a humped shape.
The results we find can help differentiate between the corporate debt valuation models
derived from option pricing theory. The upward sloping spread curve for high-rated debt is
consistent with the models of Merton (1974), Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997), Longstaff and
Schwartz (1995), and Pitts and Selby (1983). It is inconsistent with the humped shape derived by
Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1987). The humped shape for BBB industrial debt is
predicted by Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997) and Kim, Ranaswamy and Sundaresan (1987),
and is consistent with Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and Merton (1974) if BBB is considered
11 While the BBB industrial curve is consistent with the models that are mentioned,
estimated default rates shown in Table IV are inconsistent with the assumptions
these models make.  Thus the humped BBB industrial curve is inconsistent with
spread being driven only by defaults.
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low-rated debt.11
We will now examine the results of employing spot rates to estimate bond prices.
C. Fit Error
One test of how well the spot rates extracted from corporate yield curves explain prices in
the corporate market is to directly compare actual prices with the model prices derived by
discounting coupon and principal payments at the estimated spot rates.   Model price and actual
price can differ because of errors in the actual price and because bonds within the same rating
class, as defined by a rating agency, are not homogenous in risk. We calculate model prices for
each bond in each rating category every month using the spot yield curves estimated for that
rating class in that month. Each month average error (error is measured as actual minus
theoretical price) along with the square root of the average squared error is calculated. This is
then averaged over the full ten years and separately for the first and last five years for each rating
category. The average error for all rating classes is very close to zero being less than one cent on
a hundred dollar bond.  The root mean square error is a measure of the variance of errors within
each rating class.   The average root mean squared error between actual price and estimated price
12In a separate paper, we explore whether the difference in theoretical price and invoice
price is random or related to bond characteristics.  Bond characteristics do explain some of the
differences but the characteristics and relationships do not change the results in this paper.
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is shown in Table II.  The average root mean square error of 21 cents per 100 dollars for
Treasuries is comparable to the average root mean squared error found in other studies. Elton and
Green (1998) showed average errors of about 16 cents per $100 using GovPX data over the
period June 1991 to September 1995. GovPX data are trade prices, yet the difference in error
between the studies is quite small. Green and Odegaard (1997) used the Cox, Ingersoll and Ross
(1987) procedure to estimate spot rates using data from CRSP. While their procedure and time
period are different from ours, their errors again are about the same as those we find for
government bonds in our data set (our errors are smaller). The data set and procedures we are
using seem to produce comparable size errors in pricing government bonds to those found by
other authors.
The average root mean square pricing errors become larger as we examine lower grade of
bonds while the average error does not change. Average root mean square pricing errors are over
twice as large for AA’s as for Treasuries. The root mean square pricing errors for BBB’s are
almost twice those of AA’s, with the errors in A’s falling in between. Thus default risk leads not
only to higher spot rates, but also to greater uncertainty as to the appropriate value of the bond,
and this is reflected in a higher root mean square error (variance of pricing errors). This is an
added source of risk and may well be reflected in higher risk premiums, a subject we investigate
shortly.12
13 The assumption of receiving a constant proportion of face value has been made in
the literature by Brennen and Schwartz (1980) and Duffie (1998).  We are
assuming that default payment occurs at the time of default.  This is consistent
with the evidence that default occurs because of an inability to meet a payment. 
We also assume that recovery rate is a percentage of par.  This is how all data is
collected (e.g. Altman (1997)).
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III DEFAULT SPREADS
 In this section, we will examine the magnitude of the spread under risk neutrality with
the tax differences between corporates and governments ignored. Later we will introduce tax
differences and examine whether default spreads and taxes together are sufficient to explain the
observed spot spread. 
If investors were risk neutral (risk neutrality), the expected cash flows could be
discounted at the government bond rate to obtain the corporate bonds’ value. Consider a two-
period bond using expected cash flows and risk neutrality. For simplicity, assume its par value at
maturity is $1. We wish to determine its value at time zero and we do so recursively by valuing it
first at time 1 (as seen at time 0) and then at time 0. 
Its value as of time one when it is a one-period bond has three component parts: the value of the
expected coupon to be received at 2, the value of the expected principal to be received at 2 if the
bond goes bankrupt at 2, and the value of the principal if the bond survives where all
expectations are conditional on the bond surviving to period 1. This can be expressed as13
(1)V C P aP P e r
G
12 2 2 21 1 12= - + + -
-[ ( ) ( )]
14 We discount at the forward rate. For this is the rate which can be contracted at
time zero for moving money across time.
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Where
 is the coupon rateC
is the probability of bankruptcy in period t conditional on no bankruptcy in an earlier periodPt
is the recovery rate assumed constant in each perioda
is the forward rate as of time 0 from t to t+1 for government (risk-free) bonds14rtt
G
+1
is the value of a T period bond at time t given that it has not gone bankrupt in an earlierVtT
period.
Alternatively, valuing the bond using promised cash flows, its value is:
                          (2)V C e r
C
12 1 12= +
-( )
Where
1.  Is the forward rate from t to t+1 for corporate bondsrt t
C
+1
Equating the two values and rearranging to solve for the difference between corporate and
government forward rates, we have:
              (3)e P
aP
C
r rC G- - = - +
+
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12 12 1
12
2
15 The difference in forward rates may vary across bonds with different coupons,
even for bonds of the same rating class because, as discussed earlier, arbitrage on
promised payments is an approximation which holds exactly only under certain
assumptions (see Duffie and Singleton (1999)).  Thus, the estimates of spot rates
obtained empirically are averages across bonds with different coupons, and one
single spot rate does not hold exactly for all bonds.  Nevertheless, given the size
of the pricing error found in the previous section, assuming one rate is a good
approximation.
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at time zero, the value of the two-period bond using risk neutral valuation is
(4)V C P aP P V e r
G
02 1 1 1 121 1 01= - + + -
-[ ( ) ( ) )]
and using promised cash flows, its value is
            V C V e r
C
02 12
01= + -[ ]
Equating these expressions for  and solving for the difference in one period spot (or forward)V02
rates, we have
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In general, in period t the difference in forward rates is15
16 We examined alternative reasonable estimates for coupon rates and found only
second order effects in our results. While this might seem inconsistent with
equation (6), note that from the recursive application of equation (1) and (2)
changes in C are largely offset by opposite changes in V.  
17 Each row of the transition matrix shows the probability of having a given rating in
one year contingent on starting with the rating specified by the row.
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1. VTT = 1
We can now use equation (6) to obtain estimates of the default spreads on corporate
bonds. The inputs to equation (6) were obtained as follows: First, the coupon was set so that a
ten-year bond with that coupon would be selling close to par in all periods.16 Then, estimates of
default rates and recovery rates were computed.  To estimate future default rates, we used a
transition matrix and a default vector. We employed two separate estimates of the transition
matrix, one estimated by S&P (See Altman (1997)) and one estimated by Moody’s (Carty &
Fons(1994)).17 These are the two principal rating agencies for corporate debt. The transition
matrixes are shown in Table III.
18 Technically it is the last column of the squared transition matrix divided by one 
minus the probability of default in period 1.
19 These default probabilities as a function of age are high relative to prior studies
e.g., Altman (1997), Moody’s (1998).
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The probability of default given a particular rating at the beginning of the year is shown
as the last column in Table III. Given the transition matrix and an initial  rating, we can estimate
the probability of a default in each future year, given that the bond has not defaulted prior to that
year.  In year one, the probability of default can be determined directly from the transition matrix
and default vector, and is whatever proportion of that rating class defaults in year one. To obtain
year two defaults, we first use the transition matrix to calculate the ratings going into year two for
any bond starting with a particular rating in year 1. Year two defaults are then the proportion in
each rating class times the probability that a bond in that class defaults by year-end.18 Table IV
shows the default probabilities by age and initial rating class for the Moody’s and S&P transition
data. The entries in this table represent the probability of default for any year t given an initial
rating and given that the bond was not in default at time t-1.
Table IV shows the importance of rating drift over time on default probabilities. The
marginal probability of default increases for the high rated debt and decreases for the low rated
debt. This occurs because bonds change rating classes over time.19 For example, a bond rated
AAA by S&P has zero probability of defaulting one year later. However, given that it hasn’t
previously defaulted, its probability of defaulting twenty years latter is .206%. In the intervening
years some of the bonds originally rated AAA have migrated to lower-rated categories where
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there is some probability of default. At the other extreme, a bond originally rated CCC has a
probability of defaulting equal to 22.052% in the next year, but if it survives twenty more years
the probability of default in the next year is only 2.928%. If it survives  twenty years, the bond is
likely to have a higher rating. Despite this drift, 20 years later bonds which were  rated very
highly at the beginning of the period tend to have a higher probability of staying out of default
after twenty years than do bonds which had a low rating.  However rating migration means this
does not hold for all risk classes.  For example, note that after 12 years the conditional
probability of default for CCC’s is lower than the default probability for B’s.  Why?  Examining
Table III shows that the odds of being upgraded to investment grade conditional on not defaulting
is higher for CCC than B.  Eventually, bonds that start out as CCC and continue to exist will be
higher rated than those that start out as B’s.  In short, the small percentage of CCC bonds that
continue to exist for many years, end up at higher ratings on average than the larger percentage of
B bonds that continue to exist for many years.
In addition to estimates of the probability of default, we need estimates of recovery rates
for defaulted bonds. The estimates available for recovery rates by rating class are computed as a
function of the rating at time of issuance. Table V shows these recovery rates. Thus of necessity
we assume the same recovery rate independent of the maturity of the bond and that the recovery
rate of a bond currently ranked AA is the same as a newly issued AA bond.
Employing equation (6) along with the default rates from Table IV, the recovery rates
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from Table V, and the coupon rates estimated as explained earlier allows us to calculate the
forward rates assuming risk neutrality and zero taxes.  This is then converted to an estimate of
the spot spread due to expected default under the same assumptions.
Table VI shows the zero tax spread due to expected default under risk neutral valuation.
The first characteristic to note is the size of the tax-free spread due to expected default relative to
the empirical corporate spread discussed earlier. The zero tax spread from expected default is
very small and does not account for much of the corporate spread. This can be seen graphically in
Figure 2 for A rated industrial bonds.  One factor that could cause us to underestimate the spread
due to expected default is that our transition matrix estimates are not calculated over exactly the
same period for which we estimate the spreads. However, there are three factors that make us
believe that we have not underestimated default spreads. First, our default estimates shown in
Table IV are higher than those estimated in other studies. Second, the average default
probabilities over the period where the transition matrix is estimated by Moody’s and S&P are
close to the average default probabilities in the period we estimate spreads (albeit default
probabilities in the latter period are somewhat higher). Third, the S&P transition matrix which
was estimated in a period with higher average default probability and more closely matches the
years in which we estimate spread results in lower estimates of defaults. However, as a further
check on the effect of default rates on spreads, we calculated the standard deviation of year-to-
year default rates over the 20 years ending 1996. We then increased the mean default rate by two
standard deviations. This resulted in a maximum increase in spread for AA’s of .004% and
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.023% for BBB’s. Thus, even with extreme default rates, premiums due to expected losses are
too small to account for the observed spreads. It also suggest that changes in premiums due to
expected loss over time are too small to account for any significant part of the change in spreads
over time.
Also note from Table VI the zero tax risk spread due to default loss of AA’s relative to
BBB’s. While the spread for BBB’s is higher, the difference in spreads because of differences in
default experience is much less than the differences in the empirical corporate spreads.
Differences in default rates cannot explain the differences in spreads between bonds of various
rating classes. This strongly suggests that differences in spreads must be explained by other
influences, such as taxes or risk premiums. The second characteristic of spreads due to expected
default loss to note is the pattern of spreads as the maturity of the spot rate increases. The spread
increases for longer maturity spots. This is the same pattern we observe for the empirical spreads
shown in Table I. However, for AA and A the increase in premiums due to expected default loss
with maturity is less than the increase in the empirical corporate spread.
IV. TAX SPREADS 
Another difference between government bonds and corporate bonds is that the interest
payments on corporate bonds are subject to state tax with maximum marginal rates generally
between  five and ten percent. Since state tax is deductible from income for the purpose of
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federal tax, the burden of state tax is reduced by the federal tax rate. Nevertheless, state taxes
could be a major contributor to the spreads. For example, if the coupon was 10% and effective
state taxes were 5%, state taxes alone would result in a 1/2% spread (.05 x .10).  To analyze the
impact of state taxes on spreads, we introduced taxes into the analysis developed in the prior
section. For a one-period bond maturing at $1, the basic valuation equation after state taxes is:
(7)V C P t t aP a P t t P es g s g
rG
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where
1.  is the government forward rate (which is the spot rate in Period 1).r G01
2. ts is the state tax rate
3. tg is the federal tax rate
other terms are as before.
Equation (7) has two terms that differ from the prior section. The change in the first term
represents the payment of taxes on the coupon.  The new third term is the tax refund due to a
capital loss if the bond defaults.
The valuation equation on promised cash flows is
V C e r
C
01 1 01= +
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Equating the two expression for  and solving for the difference between corporate andV01
government rates, we have
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The first two terms are identical to the terms shown before where only default risk is
taken into account. The last term is the new term that captures the effect of taxes. Taxes enter it
in two ways. First, the coupon is taxable and its value is reduced by taxes and is paid with
probability (1-P1). Second, if the firm defaults (with probability P1), the amount lost in default is
a capital loss and taxes are recovered. Note that since state taxes are a deduction against federal
taxes, the marginal impact of state taxes is ts(1-tg).
As in the prior section, these equations can be generalized to the T period case. The final
equation is
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This equation is used to estimate the forward rate spread because of loss due to expected default
and taxes.
The inputs were determined as follows: The coupon was set so that a ten-year bond would
20 We tried alternative coupons. The spread is reasonably insensitive to changes in
the coupon and none of the discussion would change with reasonable variations in
the coupon.
21 See Commerce Clearing House (1997)
22 For smaller institutions it is 34%.
28
sell at par.20 The same probabilities of default and recovery rates were used as were used when
we calculated the premium due to expected default in the last section. Table IV gives the default
probabilities as a function of time, and Table V the recovery rates. State taxes and federal taxes
are more difficult to estimate. We used three procedures. First we looked at state tax codes.  For
most states, maximum marginal state tax rates range between 5% and 10%.21 Since the marginal
tax rate used to price bonds should be a weighted average of the active traders, we assumed that a
maximum marginal tax rate would be approximately the mid-point of the range of maximum
state taxes, or 7.5%. In almost all states, state tax for financial institutions (the main holder of
bonds) is paid on income subject to federal tax. Thus, if interest is subject to maximum state
rates, it must also be subject to maximum federal tax, and we assume the maximum federal tax
rate of 35%.22  
Our second attempt at estimating taxes was to directly determine the effective tax rate
(state tax rate adjusted for a federal rate) that best explained market prices.  We examined eleven
different values of effective tax rates ranging from 0% to 10% in steps of one percent.  For each
tax rate, we estimated the after tax cash flow for every bond in every month in our sample.  This
was done using cash flows as defined in the multi-period version of equation (7).  Then for each
23 One other estimate in the literature that we are aware of is that produced by
Severen and Stewart (1992 ) who estimate state taxes at 5%.
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month, rating class and tax rate we estimated the spot rates using the Nelson Siegal procedure
discussed in section II-B, but now applied to after tax expected cash flows.    These spot yield
curves are then applied to the appropriate after tax expected cash flows to price all bonds in each
rating class in each month.  The difference between this computed price and the actual price is
calculated for each tax rate.  The tax rate which resulted in the smallest mean square error
between calculated price and actual price is determined.  When we do so, we find that an
effective tax rate of 4% results in the smallest mean squared pricing error.  In addition, the 4%
rate produced errors that were significantly lower (at the five percent significance level) than any
other rate except 3%. Since the errors were lower on average with the 4%  rate we employ this
rate for later analysis.23  For the first two estimates of effective taxes, we obtain corporate spreads
shown in panel A and B of Table VII. In doing so we convert the forward rates determined from
equation (9) to spot rates. Note first that the spreads are less than those found empirically as
shown in Table I and that for our best estimate of effective state taxes (4%), state taxes are more
important than expected default in explaining spreads. Recall that increasing default probabilities
by two standard deviations only increased the spread for AA bonds by .003%. Thus increasing
defaults to an extreme historical level and, on top of that, allowing the maximum or estimated tax
rates is insufficient to explain the corporate spreads found empirically. 
However, there is a fair amount of uncertainty as to the appropriate tax rates. Thus we
employed one final procedure to try to see if tax rates and default risk are together sufficient to
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explain spreads.  Since AA bonds have the lowest default probabilities in our sample, we would
expect the risk premium on these bonds to be smaller than the risk premium on lower rated
bonds.  If we assume that the risk premium on these bonds is zero, we can get an estimate of the
tax rate that is necessary to explain AA spreads. The effective state tax rate needed to explain AA
spreads is 6.7%.  There are many combinations of federal and state taxes that are consistent with
this number. However, as noted above, since state tax is paid on federal income, it is illogical to
assume a high state rate without a corresponding high federal rate. Thus the only pair of rates that
would explain spreads on AA’s is a state tax rate of 10.3% and a federal rate of 35%. There are
very few states with a 10% rate. Thus, it is hard to explain spreads on AA bonds with taxes and
default rates. 
Furthermore, we see no reason why the tax factor should differ for AA or BBB bonds. 
We can apply the tax factor of 6.7% (that completely explains AA spread) to A and BBB rated
bonds.  When we do so, we get the estimated spreads shown in Table VII, Panel C.  Note that the
rates determined by using the risk neutral valuation model on expected values and the tax rates
that explain the spreads on AA debt underestimate the spreads on A and BBB bonds.  Taxes,
default rates, and whatever risk premium that is inherent in AA bonds underestimate the
corporate spread on lower rated bonds.  Furthermore, as shown in Table VII, Panel C, the amount
of the underestimation goes up as the quality of the bonds examined goes down.  The inability of
tax and default rates to explain the corporate spread for AAs even at extreme tax rates, and the
inability to explain the difference in spreads between AA’s and BBB’s suggest a non zero risk
24 An alternative possibility to that discussed shortly is that we might expect a large
risk premium because of low probability of default for the following reasons. 
Bankruptcies tend to cluster in time and institutions are highly levered, so that
even with low average bankruptcy losses, there is still a significant chance of
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premium.
Figure II shows the premium due to expected default loss and tax premium for A rated
industrials where the tax premium is based on our best estimate of effective state taxes (4%). 
Note, once again, that using our best estimate of effective state tax rate that state taxes are more
important than the default premium in explaining spreads.  State taxes have been ignored in
almost all modeling of the spread (see Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997), Das and Tufano
(1996) and Duffee (1998)).  Our results indicate that state taxes should be an important influence
that should be included in such models if they are to help us understand the causes of corporate
bond spreads.
V. RISK PREMIUMS
As shown in the last section, premiums due to expected default and state tax rates are
insufficient to explain the spread in corporate bonds.  Thus, we need to examine the risk
premium.  There are two issues that need to be addressed.  What causes a risk premium and,
given the small size of the expected default loss, why the risk premium is so large.24
financial difficulty at an uncertain time in the future and we need a premium to
compensate for this risk.  Even if the institutional bankruptcy risk is small, the
consequences of an individual issue bankruptcy on a manager’s career may be so
significant as to induce decision makers to require a substantial premium.
25 See, for example, Elton (1999)
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  If corporate bond returns move systematically with other assets in the market while
government bonds do not, then corporate bond expected returns would require a risk premium to
compensate for the non-diversifiability of corporate bond risk, just like any other asset.  The
literature of Financial Economics provides evidence that government bond returns are not
sensitive to the influences driving stock returns.25  There are two reasons why changes in
corporate spreads might be systematic.  First, if expected default loss were to move with equity
prices, so as stock prices rise default risk  goes down and as they fall it goes up, it would
introduce a systematic factor.  Second, the compensation for risk required in capital markets
might change over time.  If changes in the required compensation for risk affects both corporate
bond and stock markets, then this would introduce a systematic influence.  We shall now
demonstrate that such a relationship exists and that it explains most of the risk premium. We
shall do so by relating unexplained spreads (corporate spreads less both the premium for
expected default and the tax premium as determined from equation (9)) to variables which have
been used as systematic risk factors in the pricing of common stocks.  By studying the sensitivity
to these risk factors we can estimate the size of the premium required and see if it explains the
remaining part of the spread.  Throughout we will assume a 4% effective state tax rate which is
our estimate from the prior section
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 In order to examine the impact of sensitivities on unexplained spreads we need to specify
a return generating model. 
We can write a general return generating model as
(10)R a f et j jt t
j
= + +å b
for each year (two through ten) and each rating class
Where
1. is the return during month t. Rt
2. is the sensitivity of changes in the spread to factor j.b j
3. is return on factor j during month t.  The factors are each formulated as thef jt
difference in return between two portfolios (zero net investment portfolios).
While this process holds for returns, we want to relate it to the metric that we are
investigating, the unexplained spread.  Let  and be the spot rates on  corporate andrt m
c
, rt m
G
,
government bonds that mature m periods later respectively.   Then the price of a pure discount
bond with face value equal to one dollar is
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c
,
,= - ×
26 This is not the total return on holding a corporate or government bond, but rather
the portion of the return due to changing spread (the term we wish to examine).
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Where  is the change in spread from time to on a period bond.  Thus theD St m, t t + 1 m
27 We used two multi-factor models, the Connor Korajczyk (1993) empirically
derived model and the multi-factor model tested by us earlier see Elton, Gruber
and Blake (1998).  These results will be discussed in footnotes.  We thank Bob
Korajczyk for supplying us with the monthly returns on the Connor Korajczyk
factors.
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difference in return between corporate and government bonds due to a change in spread is equal
to minus m times the change in spread.
Recognize that we are interested in the unexplained spread which is the difference between the
corporate government spread and that part of the spread which is explained by expected default
loss and taxes.  We can write the unexplained differential in returns where the superscript has
been added to note that we are dealing with that part of the spread on corporate bonds that is not
explained by expected default loss and taxes as:
(12)
( ) ( )[ ]R R m r r r r m St tuc t tG t muc t mG t muc t mG t mu, , , , , , ,+ + + +- = - - - - = -1 1 1 1 D
  
There are many forms of a multi-index model which we could employ to study
unexplained spreads.  We chose to concentrate our results on the Fama-French 3-factor model
because of its wide use in the literature but we also investigated other models including the single
index model and some of the results will be discussed in footnotes.27  The Fama-French model
employs the excess return on the market, the return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the
28 If we find no systematic influences it does not imply that the unexplained returns
are not risk premiums due to systematic influences.  It may simply mean that we
have failed to uncover the correct systematic influences.  However, finding a
relationship is evidence that the unexplained returns are due to a risk premium 
29 The results are almost identical using the Connor Korajczyk empirically derived
factors or the Elton, Gruber and Blake (1998) model. When a single factor model
is used, 20 out of 27 betas are significant with an R2 of about 0.10.
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return on a portfolio of large stocks (the SMB factor) and the return on a portfolio of high minus
low book to market stocks (the HML factor) as its three factors.
Table VIII shows the results of regressing return of corporates over governments derived
from the change in unexplained spread for industrial bonds (as in equation (12)) against the Fama
French factors.28  The regression coefficient on the market factor is always positive and is
statistically significant 20 out of 27 times. This is the sign we would expect on the basis of
theory.  This holds for the Fama French market factor, and also holds (see Table VIII) for the
other Fama French factors representing size and book to market ratios. The return is positively
related to the SMB factor and to the HML factor.29  Notice that the sensitivity to all of these
factors tends to increase as maturity increases and to increase as quality decreases.  This is
exactly what would be expected if we were indeed measuring risk factors.  Examining financials
shows similar results except that the statistical significance of the regression coefficients and the
size of the  is higher for AA’s. R2
 
It appears that the change in spread not related to taxes or expected defaults is at least in
30 Employing a single index model using sensitivity to the excess return on the S&P
index, leads to of .21 and .43 for industrial and financial bonds respectively..R2
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part explained by factors which have been successful in explaining changes in returns over time
in the equity market. We will now turn to examining cross sectional differences in average
unexplained premiums.  If there is a risk premium for sensitivity to stock market factors
unexplained premium should be linearly related to the sensitivities of the unexplained premiums
(the ’s from equation (12)) and differences in sensitivities should explain differences in theb
unexplained premium across corporate bonds of different maturity and different rating class.  We
have 27 unexplained spreads for industrial bonds and 27 for financial bonds since maturities
range from 2 years, through 10 years, and there are three rating classifications.  When we regress
the average unexplained spread against sensitivities for industrial bonds the cross sectional
adjusted for degrees of freedom is .32, while for financials it is .58.  We have been able toR2
account for almost 1/3 of the difference in unexplained premiums for industrials and more
than1/2 for financial bonds.30
Another way to examine this is to ask how much of the unexplained spread can the
sensitivities account for.  That is for each maturity and risk class of bonds what is the size of the
unexplained spread that existed versus the size of the risk premium that is accounted for by the
sensitivity of the bonds to the three factors times the price of these factors over the time period. 
For industrials the average risk premium is .813, while just employing the sensitivities we would
estimate it to be .660.  For financial, the actual risk premium is .934 but using the estimated beta
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and prices it is .605.  In short, 85% of the industrial unexplained spread is accounted by the three
risk sensitivities while for financials it is 67%.  Note that whether we use the cross sectional
explanatory power or the size of the estimate relative to the realized risk premium we see that
standard risk measures have been able to account for a high percentage of the unexplained
spread.
We tried one more set of tests.  One possible explanation for our results is that the Fama
French factors are proxying for changes in default expectations.  If this is the case, in cross
section, the sensitivity of unexplained spreads to the factors may in part be picking up the market
price of systematic changes in default expectations.  To test this we added several measures of
changes in default risk to equation (10) as a fourth factor.  We tried actual changes (perfect
forecasting) and several distributed lag and lead models.  None of the results were statistically
significant or had consistent signs across different groups of bonds.
 In this section we have shown that the change in unexplained spread is related to factors
that are considered systematic in the stock market. Modern risk theory states that systematic risk
needs to be compensated for and thus, common equity has to earn a risk premium. Changes in
corporate spreads lead to changes in return on corporates and thus, returns on corporates are also
systematically related to common stock factors with the same sign as common equity. If common
equity receives a risk premium for this systematic risk then corporate bonds must also earn a risk
premium. We have shown that sensitivity to the factors that are used to explain risk premiums in
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common stocks explain between 1/3 and ½ of the spread in corporate and government rates that
is not explained by the difference between promised and expected payments and taxes.  This is
strong evidence of the existence of a risk premium of a magnitude that has economic significance
and provides an explanation as to why the risk premium is so large.
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VI.  CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have examined the size and cause of differences in spot rates on
corporate bonds relative to government bonds. We have discussed the methodology for arriving
at, and the results from looking at, corporate spot spreads. The properties of the corporate spot
spread are useful in examining the reasonableness of alternative corporate bond valuation models
derived from option pricing. We then examine the three components of the corporate spot spread:
the premium due to expected default, a tax premium, and the unexplained portion. We show that
the premium due to expected loss is quite small compared to the overall corporate spread. 
Differential taxes, on the other hand, can potentially be a major factor in accounting for the
overall corporate spread. Finally, of key significance, our results indicate that a large part of the
remainder of the spread appears to be a risk premium in the pricing of corporate debt.  We show
that part of the corporate spread not explained by expected loss or taxes has a strong relationship
to priced systematic risk factors which have been found to account for differences in expected
stock returns.  Furthermore, differences in the size of the unexplained spread is related to
differences in the sensitivity to the systematic factors.
There has been a lot of modeling in the corporate bond area.  One of the purposes of this
paper is to provide empirical facts and estimates of the magnitude of influences that a model
should reflect in order to explain what determines actual spreads.  In particular, we show that
state taxes explain part of the spread and that the risk premium is partially a compensation for
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systematic components in the financial markets and not just compensation for increased default
risk.  Models such as Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull(1997) and its descendants which explain prices
in terms of risk adjusted probabilities have not yet been able to decompose returns into
components due to expected loss, taxes, and risk premiums.  To price debt instruments with
different risk or tax implications one has to know the sources and magnitude of the influences
which effect bond prices.  The decompositions are necessary for a rational choice by investors
facing different taxes and having different degrees of risk aversion.
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EFFECT OF CHANGES IN THE TREASURY SPOT CURVE ON CORPORATE
SPREADS
[this section, included in Draft 7, was not returned with edits]
In this section we examine what happens to corporate spreads as the level and shape of
the Treasury (riskless) spot curve changes. While the relationship of corporate spread calculated
as differences in yield to maturity has been examined with respect to changes in the level and
slope of the Treasury yield curve, this is the first paper to examine it when corporate spread is
calculated using differences in spot rates.
In Table _____ the results are reported for industrial bonds from regressing the change in
the spot corporate spread for each maturity against changes in the level and steepness of the
Treasury spot curve. In the regression level was measured by the spot rate for two-year Treasuries
and steepness by the difference between the spot rate for ten-year Treasuries and two-year
Treasuries.31
The surprising results from this table are how much of the change in risk spread is
explained by changes in the steepness and level of the U.S. Treasuries spot curve. Most of this is
due to changes in the steepness of the U.S. Treasury spot curve. For spots at or above six years,
examining a univariate regression with only steepness (not shown) shows that over 50% of the
change in corporate spreads are explained by changes in the steepness of the government spot
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curve. Examining the t values and R2 from Table _____ shows that for corporate spreads of three
years or more, almost all of the explanatory power is associated with changes in the Treasury
curve. The relationship is positive, indicating that when the spread between long-term spots and
short-term spots increases the corporate spreads between any category of risky debt and
Treasuries goes up. The different between long government rates and short government rates has
frequently been used as a risk measure. To the extent that the steepness of the government spot
curve reflects risk and uncertainty, it is logical that it is highly correlated with corporate risk
spreads.
Table _____ also demonstrates that changes in the corporate spreads of corporates are
negatively correlated with the change in the level of short-term Treasury spots. While this
relationship is highly persistent across all risk classes and maturities, it is rarely statistically
significant and this variable as a stand-alone explanation has very weak explanatory power
except for the risk spread for two- and three-year spots. It does appear that as short-term Treasury
spots go up, there is a small tendency for corporate spreads to narrow.
32 Some authors (to be added) have argued that risk avoidance does not exist in the
corporate bond market and differences between expected and promised cash flows
account for all of the difference in the price of corporate and government debt.
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THE APPLICABILITY OF SPOT RATES TO PROMISED PAYMENTS
Up to now we have studied a set of spot (or future) rates that are consistent with the
pricing of risky debt. In this section of the paper we show that solving for these spot rates and/or
associated discount functions to price risky debt is at best a close approximation to the way such
debt should be priced in the market. We will do so by first considering the pricing of debt in a
risk-neutral world. Later we will attempt to see if the debt markets exhibit risk avoidance.32
The use of spot rates to price government bonds is justified by the law of one price.
Identical certain cash flows in the future must have the same present value and so be discounted
at the same rate. In a risk-neutral world, the same pricing principal must apply to expected cash
flows.
In the simple example which follows, we show that in general a portfolio which has the
same expected cash flows as a second portfolio will not have the same promised cash flows. For
simplicity, consider three bonds. Bond A is a two-period coupon bond, bond B a one-period pure
discount bond, and bond C a two-period pure discount bond. Assume they all have the same
promised coupon (C) and that the probability of failing in any period is the same, denoted by P,
and the par value is $1.
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The expected cash flows from the bonds are given in the table below:
Period 1 Period 2
Bond A C (1 - P) + Pa C (1 - P)2 + Pa (1 - P) + (1 - P)2
Bond B C (1 - P) + Pa + (1 - P)
Bond C Pa C (1 - P)2 + Pa (1 - P) + (1 - P)2
Identical expected cash flows in Period 2 are obtained by holding one unit of Bond A and
one unit of Bond C. To match the expected cash flow from Bond A in Period 1, given that we
hold one unit of Bond C, enough of Bond B must be held to generate a cash flow C (1 - P). This
means that  units of Bond B must be held. In a risk-neutral world, since these
C
C
Pa
P
1
1
+ +
-
portfolios have the same expected cash flow, each period, they must sell at the same price and
each period a single discount rate is appropriate for arriving at the price.
If we examine the promised cash flow on these bonds, we get a different result:
PROMISED CASH FLOW
Period 1 Period 2
Bond A C C + 1
50
Bond B C + 1
Bond C C + 1
While holding one unit of bond C matches the cash flow of bond A in Period 2,
holding  of bond B plus bond C does not cause promised cash flows to be matched in
c
c
P
a
P
1
1
+ +
-
period 1. To match promised cash flows, we should hold units of Bond B. While the
C
C1+
correct discount rate to use on expected cash flows is purely a function of time, the correct
discount rate to use for promised payments is not independent of the pattern of payments and
thus is not simply based on time. This means the estimation of spot rates on promised cash flows
is an approximation.
Table I
Measured Spread From Treasury
This table reports the average spread from treasuries for AA, A, and BBB bonds in the financial and
industrial sectors.  For each column, spot rates were derived using standard Gauss-Newton non-linear least
squared methods as described in the text.  Treasuries are reported as annualized spot rates.  Corporates are
reported as the difference between the derived corporate spot rates and the derived treasury spot rates.  The
financial sector and the industrial sector are defined by the bonds contained in the Lehman Brother’s
financial index and industrial index respectively.  Panel A contains the average spot rates and spreads over
the entire ten year period.  Panel B contains the averages for the first five years and panel C contains the
averages for the final five years.
Treasuries Financial Sector Industrial Sector
Maturity AA A BBB AA A BBB
Panel A:     1987-1996
2 6.414 0.586 0.745 1.199 0.414 0.621 1.167
3 6.689 0.606 0.791 1.221 0.419 0.680 1.205
4 6.925 0.624 0.837 1.249 0.455 0.715 1.210
5 7.108 0.637 0.874 1.274 0.493 0.738 1.205
6 7.246 0.647 0.902 1.293 0.526 0.753 1.199
7 7.351 0.655 0.924 1.308 0.552 0.764 1.193
8 7.432 0.661 0.941 1.320 0.573 0.773 1.188
9 7.496 0.666 0.955 1.330 0.589 0.779 1.184
10 7.548 0.669 0.965 1.337 0.603 0.785 1.180
Panel B:     1987-1991
2 7.562 0.705 0.907 1.541 0.436 0.707 1.312
3 7.763 0.711 0.943 1.543 0.441 0.780 1.339
4 7.934 0.736 0.997 1.570 0.504 0.824 1.347
5 8.066 0.762 1.047 1.599 0.572 0.853 1.349
6 8.165 0.783 1.086 1.624 0.629 0.872 1.348
7 8.241 0.800 1.118 1.644 0.675 0.886 1.347
8 8.299 0.813 1.142 1.659 0.711 0.897 1.346
9 8.345 0.824 1.161 1.672 0.740 0.905 1.345
10 8.382 0.833 1.177 1.682 0.764 0.912 1.344
Panel C:     1992-1996
2 5.265 0.467 0.582 0.857 0.392 0.536 1.022
3 5.616 0.501 0.640 0.899 0.396 0.580 1.070
4 5.916 0.511 0.676 0.928 0.406 0.606 1.072
5 6.150 0.512 0.701 0.948 0.415 0.623 1.062
6 6.326 0.511 0.718 0.962 0.423 0.634 1.049
7 6.461 0.510 0.731 0.973 0.429 0.642 1.039
8 6.565 0.508 0.740 0.981 0.434 0.649 1.030
9 6.647 0.507 0.748 0.987 0.438 0.653 1.022
10 6.713 0.506 0.754 0.993 0.441 0.657 1.016
Table II
Average Root Mean Squared Errors
This table contains the average root mean square error of the difference between theoretical price computed
from the spot rates derived from the Gauss-Newton procedure and the actual bond invoice prices.  For a
given class of securities, the root mean squared error is calculated once per period.  The number reported is
the average of all the root mean squared errors within a class over the period indicated.
Period     Treasuries Financial Sector Industrial Sector
AA A BBB AA A BBB
1987-1996 0.210 0.512 0.861 1.175 0.728 0.874 1.516
1987-1991 0.185 0.514 0.996 1.243 0.728 0.948 1.480
1992-1996 0.234 0.510 0.726 1.108 0.727 0.800 1.552
Table III
One Year Transition Probability Matrix
The Panel (A) below is taken from Carty and Fons (1994) and Panel (B) is from S&P (1995). However, the
category in the original references titled Non-Rated (which is primarily bonds that are bought back or issued
by companies which merge) has been allocated to the other rating classes so that each row sums to one.
Each entry in a row shows the probability that a bond with a rating shown in the first column ends up one
year later in the category shown in the column headings.
Panel (A) : Moody’s
Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Default
Aaa 91.897% 7.385% 0.718% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Aa 1.131% 91.264% 7.091% 0.308% 0.206% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
A 0.102% 2.561% 91.189% 5.328% 0.615% 0.205% 0.000% 0.000%
Baa 0.000% 0.206% 5.361% 87.938% 5.464% 0.825% 0.103% 0.103%
Ba 0.000% 0.106% 0.425% 4.995% 85.122% 7.333% 0.425% 1.594%
B 0.000% 0.109% 0.109% 0.543% 5.972% 82.193% 2.172% 8.903%
Caa 0.000% 0.437% 0.437% 0.873% 2.511% 5.895% 67.795% 22.052%
Default 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 100.000%
Panel (B) : Standard and Poor’s
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC Default
AAA 90.788% 8.291% 0.716% 0.102% 0.102% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
AA 0.103% 91.219% 7.851% 0.620% 0.103% 0.103% 0.000% 0.000%
A 0.924% 2.361% 90.041% 5.441% 0.719% 0.308% 0.103% 0.103%
BBB 0.000% 0.318% 5.938% 86.947% 5.302% 1.166% 0.117% 0.212%
BB 0.000% 0.110% 0.659% 7.692% 80.549% 8.791% 0.989% 1.209%
B 0.000% 0.114% 0.227% 0.454% 6.470% 82.747% 4.086% 5.902%
CCC 0.228% 0.000% 0.228% 1.251% 2.275% 12.856% 60.637% 22.526%
Default 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 100.000%
Table IV
Evolution of Default Probability
Probability of default in year n conditional on (a) a particular starting rating and (b) not having defaulted
prior to year n. These are determined using the transition matrix shown in Table IV. Panel (A) is based on
Moody’s transition matrix of table IV(A) and Panel (B) is based on Standard and Poor’s transition matrix of
table IV(B).
Panel (A) : Moody’s
year Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa
1 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.103% 1.594% 8.903% 22.052%
2 0.000% 0.004% 0.034% 0.274% 2.143% 8.664% 19.906%
3 0.001% 0.011% 0.074% 0.441% 2.548% 8.355% 17.683%
4 0.002% 0.022% 0.121% 0.598% 2.842% 8.003% 15.489%
5 0.004% 0.036% 0.172% 0.743% 3.051% 7.628% 13.421%
6 0.008% 0.053% 0.225% 0.874% 3.193% 7.246% 11.554%
7 0.013% 0.073% 0.280% 0.991% 3.283% 6.867% 9.927%
8 0.019% 0.095% 0.336% 1.095% 3.331% 6.498% 8.553%
9 0.027% 0.120% 0.391% 1.185% 3.348% 6.145% 7.416%
10 0.036% 0.146% 0.445% 1.264% 3.340% 5.810% 6.491%
11 0.047% 0.174% 0.499% 1.331% 3.312% 5.496% 5.743%
12 0.060% 0.204% 0.550% 1.387% 3.271% 5.203% 5.141%
13 0.074% 0.234% 0.599% 1.435% 3.218% 4.930% 4.654%
14 0.089% 0.265% 0.646% 1.474% 3.157% 4.678% 4.258%
15 0.106% 0.297% 0.691% 1.506% 3.092% 4.444% 3.932%
16 0.124% 0.329% 0.733% 1.532% 3.022% 4.229% 3.662%
17 0.143% 0.362% 0.773% 1.552% 2.951% 4.030% 3.435%
18 0.163% 0.394% 0.810% 1.567% 2.878% 3.846% 3.241%
19 0.184% 0.426% 0.845% 1.578% 2.806% 3.676% 3.074%
20 0.206% 0.457% 0.877% 1.585% 2.735% 3.519% 2.928%
Panel (B) : Standard and Poor’s
year AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC
1 0.000% 0.000% 0.103% 0.212% 1.209% 5.902% 22.526%
2 0.002% 0.017% 0.154% 0.350% 1.754% 6.253% 18.649%
3 0.007% 0.037% 0.204% 0.493% 2.147% 6.318% 15.171%
4 0.013% 0.061% 0.254% 0.632% 2.424% 6.220% 12.285%
5 0.022% 0.087% 0.305% 0.761% 2.612% 6.031% 10.031%
6 0.032% 0.115% 0.355% 0.879% 2.733% 5.795% 8.339%
7 0.045% 0.145% 0.406% 0.983% 2.804% 5.540% 7.095%
8 0.059% 0.177% 0.457% 1.075% 2.836% 5.280% 6.182%
9 0.075% 0.210% 0.506% 1.153% 2.840% 5.025% 5.506%
10 0.093% 0.243% 0.554% 1.221% 2.822% 4.780% 4.993%
11 0.112% 0.278% 0.600% 1.277% 2.790% 4.548% 4.594%
12 0.132% 0.313% 0.644% 1.325% 2.746% 4.330% 4.272%
13 0.154% 0.348% 0.686% 1.363% 2.695% 4.125% 4.006%
14 0.176% 0.383% 0.726% 1.395% 2.639% 3.934% 3.780%
15 0.200% 0.419% 0.763% 1.419% 2.581% 3.756% 3.583%
16 0.225% 0.453% 0.797% 1.439% 2.520% 3.591% 3.408%
17 0.250% 0.488% 0.830% 1.453% 2.460% 3.436% 3.252%
18 0.276% 0.521% 0.860% 1.464% 2.400% 3.292% 3.109%
19 0.302% 0.554% 0.888% 1.471% 2.341% 3.158% 2.979%
20 0.329% 0.586% 0.913% 1.475% 2.284% 3.033% 2.860%
Table V
Recovery Rates*
The table shows the percentage of par that a bond is worth one month after bankruptcy, given the rating
shown in the first column.
Original Rating Recovery Rate
AAA 68.34%
AA 59.59%
A 60.63%
BBB 49.42%
BB 39.05%
B 37.54%
CCC 38.02%
Default 0%
*From Altman and Vellore (1998)
Table VI
Mean, Minimum and Maximum Spreads assuming Risk Neutrality
This table shows the spread of corporate spot rates over government spot rates when taxes are assumed to
be zero, but default rates and recovery rates are taken into account. The corporate forward rates are
computed using equation (6). These forward rates are converted to spot rates, which are then used to
compute the spreads below.
Panel (A) : Mean Spreads
years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AA 0.000% 0.004% 0.008% 0.012% 0.017% 0.023% 0.028% 0.034% 0.041% 0.048%
A 0.043% 0.053% 0.063% 0.074% 0.084% 0.095% 0.106% 0.117% 0.128% 0.140%
BBB 0.110% 0.145% 0.181% 0.217% 0.252% 0.286% 0.319% 0.351% 0.380% 0.409%
Panel (B) : Minimum Spreads
years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AA 0.000% 0.003% 0.007% 0.011% 0.015% 0.020% 0.025% 0.031% 0.038% 0.044%
A 0.038% 0.046% 0.055% 0.063% 0.073% 0.083% 0.093% 0.104% 0.116% 0.128%
BBB 0.101% 0.132% 0.164% 0.197% 0.229% 0.262% 0.294% 0.326% 0.356% 0.385%
Panel (C) : Maximum Spreads
years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AA 0.000% 0.004% 0.009% 0.014% 0.019% 0.025% 0.031% 0.038% 0.044% 0.051%
A 0.047% 0.059% 0.071% 0.083% 0.094% 0.106% 0.117% 0.129% 0.140% 0.151%
BBB 0.118% 0.156% 0.196% 0.235% 0.273% 0.309% 0.342% 0.374% 0.403% 0.431%
Table VII
Mean, Minimum and Maximum Spreads with Taxes assuming Risk Neutrality
This table shows the spread of corporate spot rates over government spot rates when taxes as well as default
rates and recovery rates are taken into account. The corporate forward rates are computed using equation
(9). These forward rates are converted to spot rates, which are then used to compute the spreads below.
Panel (A) : Mean Spreads with effective tax rate of 4.875%
years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AA 0.358% 0.362% 0.366% 0.370% 0.375% 0.379% 0.383% 0.388% 0.393% 0.398%
A 0.399% 0.410% 0.419% 0.429% 0.438% 0.448% 0.457% 0.466% 0.476% 0.486%
BBB 0.467% 0.501% 0.535% 0.568% 0.601% 0.632% 0.662% 0.691% 0.718% 0.744%
Panel (B) : Mean Spreads with effective tax rate of 4.0%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AA 0.292% 0.296% 0.301% 0.305% 0.309% 0.314% 0.319% 0.324% 0.329% 0.335%
A 0.334% 0.344% 0.354% 0.364% 0.374% 0.383% 0.393% 0.403% 0.413% 0.423%
BBB 0.402% 0.436% 0.470% 0.504% 0.537% 0.569% 0.600% 0.629% 0.657% 0.683%
Panel (C) : Mean Spreads with effective tax rate of 6.7%
years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AA 0.496% 0.501% 0.505% 0.508% 0.512% 0.516% 0.520% 0.524% 0.528% 0.532%
A 0.537% 0.547% 0.557% 0.566% 0.575% 0.583% 0.592% 0.600% 0.609% 0.618%
BBB 0.606% 0.639% 0.672% 0.704% 0.735% 0.765% 0.794% 0.821% 0.847% 0.871%
Table VIII
Relationship between Unexplained Spreads and Treasury Term Structure
This table shows the results of regression of Unexplained Spreads on two variables summarizing the
information contained in the treasury term structure. These two variables are (a) the term spread defined as
the difference of 10 year treasury spot rate and 2 year treasury spot rate and (b) the two year treasury spot
rate. The results reported are for Industrial Corporate bonds. Similar results were obtained for Corporate
bonds issued by Financial firms. Values in parentheses are t-values.
Panel A : Industrial AA rated bonds
Maturity
in years
Constant
(10year-2year)
Treasury rate
2 year
Treasury rate
Adj-R2
2 -0.1276 0.0681 0.0262 0.0625
(-1.348) (3.145) (2.277)
3 -0.0113 0.0200 0.0166 0.0004
(-0.116) (0.901) (1.403)
4 -0.0982 0.0188 0.0354 0.1105
(-1.102) (0.923) (3.265)
5 -0.2234 0.0301 0.0582 0.3054
(-2.725) (1.604) (5.837)
6 -0.3394 0.0429 0.0784 0.4496
(-4.205) (2.324) (7.985)
7 -0.4364 0.0542 0.0948 0.5225
(-5.211) (2.831) (9.309)
8 -0.5155 0.0636 0.1080 0.5558
(-5.817) (3.138) (10.013)
9 -0.5802 0.0712 0.1184 0.5708
(-6.179) (3.316) (10.368)
10 -0.6342 0.0775 0.1270 0.5776
(-6.409) (3.423) (10.548)
Panel B : Industrial A rated bonds
Maturity
in years
Constant (10year-2year)
Treasury rate
2 year
Treasury rate
Adj-R2
2 -0.5545 0.2063 0.0933 0.2418
-(3.855) (6.270) (5.328)
3 -0.5092 0.1690 0.1004 0.2711
-(4.117) (5.974) (6.671)
4 -0.4813 0.1531 0.1028 0.3107
-(4.246) (5.906) (7.455)
5 -0.4648 0.1458 0.1035 0.3436
-(4.377) (6.002) (8.015)
6 -0.4557 0.1419 0.1037 0.3596
-(4.426) (6.027) (8.280)
7 -0.4516 0.1396 0.1037 0.3617
-(4.401) (5.950) (8.305)
8 -0.4509 0.1381 0.1036 0.3561
-(4.341) (5.815) (8.199)
9 -0.4526 0.137 0.1035 0.3474
-(4.278) (5.663) (8.044)
10 -0.4559 0.1362 0.1035 0.3380
-(4.223) (5.516) (7.878)
Panel C :Industrial BBB rated bonds
Maturity
in years
Constant (10year-2year)
Treasury rate
2 year
Treasury rate
Adj-R2
2 -1.0993 0.5513 0.1881 0.4594
-(4.543) (9.961) (6.391)
3 -0.9788 0.5158 0.1761 0.489
-(4.584) (10.562) (6.780)
4 -0.8794 0.4528 0.1672 0.4579
-(4.468) (10.059) (6.983)
5 -0.8088 0.3939 0.1607 0.4136
-(4.353) (9.270) (7.110)
6 -0.7623 0.3459 0.1559 0.3658
-(4.204) (8.341) (7.069)
7 -0.7332 0.3081 0.1524 0.3228
-(4.044) (7.430) (6.908)
8 -0.7161 0.2784 0.1496 0.2885
-(3.900) (6.629) (6.700)
9 -0.7072 0.2547 0.1475 0.2628
-(3.785) (5.961) (6.489)
10 -0.7039 0.2356 0.1458 0.2442
-(3.699) (5.414) (6.297)
Table IX
 Relationship between Returns and Fama-French Risk Factors
This table shows the results of the regression of Returns due to a change in the unexplained spread on the
Fama-French Risk Factors, viz. (a) the market excess return (over T-bills) factor (b) the Small Minus Big
factor and (c) the High Minus Low book to market factor. The results reported below are for Industrial
Corporate bonds. Similar results were obtained for bonds of Financial Firms. The values in parentheses are
t-values.
Panel A: Industrial AA rated bonds
Maturity Constant Market SMB HML Adj-R2
2 -0.0046 0.0773 0.1192 -0.0250 0.0986
-(0.297) (2.197) (2.318) -(0.404)
3 -0.0066 0.1103 0.2045 0.0518 0.0858
-(0.286) (2.114) (2.680) (0.563)
4 -0.0058 0.1238 0.2626 0.0994 0.0846
-(0.210) (1.983) (2.877) (0.903)
5 -0.0034 0.1260 0.3032 0.1261 0.0801
-(0.109) (1.791) (2.949) (1.018)
6 -0.0001 0.1222 0.3348 0.1414 0.0608
-(0.003) (1.463) (2.742) (0.961)
7 0.0035 0.1157 0.3621 0.1514 0.0374
(0.077) (1.116) (2.391) (0.829)
8 0.0073 0.1080 0.3873 0.1586 0.0195
(0.129) (0.839) (2.059) (0.700)
9 0.0112 0.0996 0.4119 0.1650 0.0076
(0.163) (0.635) (1.798) (0.598)
10 0.0151 0.0912 0.4356 0.1704 -0.0002
(0.184) (0.489) (1.598) (0.519)
Panel B: Industrial A rated bonds
Maturity Constant Market SMB HML Adj-R2
2 -0.0081 0.1353 0.1831 0.0989 0.1372
-(0.437) (3.202) (2.965) (1.329)
3 -0.0119 0.1847 0.3072 0.1803 0.2068
-(0.534) (3.631) (4.134) (2.013)
4 -0.0123 0.2178 0.3911 0.2619 0.2493
-(0.501) (3.904) (4.796) (2.666)
5 -0.0105 0.2419 0.4498 0.3424 0.2754
-(0.403) (4.068) (5.176) (3.270)
6 -0.0077 0.2616 0.4952 0.4222 0.2647
-(0.262) (3.899) (5.050) (3.573)
7 -0.0044 0.2792 0.5345 0.5014 0.226
-(0.125) (3.480) (4.560) (3.549)
8 -0.0009 0.2958 0.5709 0.5805 0.1828
-(0.020) (3.032) (4.003) (3.378)
9 0.0028 0.3121 0.6059 0.6596 0.1469
(0.053) (2.654) (3.525) (3.185)
10 0.0064 0.3282 0.6407 0.7385 0.1198
(0.105) (2.357) (3.149) (3.012)
Panel C: Industrial BBB rated bonds
Maturity Constant Market SMB HML Adj-R2
2 0.0083 0.1112 0.3401 0.1259 0.0969
(0.276) (1.626) (3.403) (1.045)
3 0.0094 0.1691 0.4656 0.2922 0.1263
(0.255) (2.010) (3.787) (1.972)
4 0.0084 0.2379 0.5836 0.4605 0.1798
(0.209) (2.601) (4.365) (2.858)
5 0.0062 0.3132 0.6987 0.6263 0.2585
(0.153) (3.406) (5.199) (3.867)
6 0.0034 0.3919 0.8127 0.7901 0.3126
(0.080) (4.025) (5.711) (4.607)
7 0.0004 0.4720 0.9260 0.9522 0.3122
(0.008) (4.147) (5.567) (4.750)
8 -0.0028 0.5528 1.0395 1.1139 0.2807
-(0.045) (3.951) (5.084) (4.520)
9 -0.006 0.6341 1.1529 1.2754 0.2445
-(0.079) (3.685) (4.585) (4.209)
10 -0.0092 0.7154 1.2662 1.4370 0.2136
-(0.101) (3.446) (4.173) (3.930)
Figure(1) : Empirical Spreads on Industrial Bonds of Six Years Maturity
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Figure(2) : Spot rates for A rated Industrial Bonds and for Treasuries
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